Cryptanalysis of an Outsourced Modular Inversion Protocol
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Keywords

Secure Delegation
Euclidean lattices
Integer linear programming

How to Cite

Bouillaguet, C. (2023). Cryptanalysis of an Outsourced Modular Inversion Protocol. Mathematical Cryptology, 3(1), 29–43. Retrieved from https://ojs.test.flvc.org/mathcryptology/article/view/132135

Abstract

Public-key cryptographic primitives involve mathematical operations that are computationally intensive for devices with limited resources. A typical approach is to offload time-consuming operations from a (computationally weak) client device to an untrusted yet computationally powerful server. Such a delegation protocol needs to achieve the privacy of the server's inputs. Recently, Tian, Yu, Zhang, Xue, Wang and Ren [IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 241-253, 2022] proposed a unimodular matrix transformation technique to realize secure outsourcing of modular inversion. We present an elementary cryptanalysis of their protocol and prove that it does not achieve the claimed security guarantees.

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Copyright (c) 2023 Charles Bouillaguet