The Species Delimitation Uncertainty Principle

Abstract

If, as Einstein said, "it is the theory which decides what we can observe," then "the species problem" could be solved by simply improving our theoretical definition of what a species is. However, because delimiting species entails predicting the historical fate of evolutionary lineages, species appear to behave according to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, which states that the most philosophically satisfying definitions of species are the least operational, and as species concepts are modified to become more operational they tend to lose their philosophical integrity. Can species be delimited operationally without losing their philosophical rigor? To mitigate the contingent properties of species that tend to make them difficult for us to delimit, I advocate a set of operations that takes into account the prospective nature of delimiting species. Given the fundamental role of species in studies of evolution and biodiversity, I also suggest that species delimitation proceed within the context of explicit hypothesis testing, like other scientific endeavors. The real challenge is not so much the inherent fallibility of predicting the future but rather adequately sampling and interpreting the evidence available to us in the present.