The True Nature of WH-*the Hell* Phrases[*]

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Abstract: Since the seminal work of Pesetsky (1987) WH-*the hell* phrases have widely been regarded as non-D-linkable. This paper shows that these phrases, as well as their Japanese counterparts, can indeed be D-linked. It also argues that both of them are identificationally focused in the sense of É. Kiss (1998), which has to do with obligatory overt movement, exhaustiveness, the unavailability of pair list readings, and existential presupposition.

0.   Introduction

Properties of WH-*the hell* phrases have been examined in the generative literature since Pesetsky (1987), who offered an interesting typology of WH-phrases in terms related to discourse. He regards WH-*the hell* phrases as non-D-linkable in his terminology, in the sense that answers for them are never to be found in prior discourse, unlike *which*-phrases, which necessarily require answers in a contextually provided set of candidates. His treatment of WH-*the hell* phrases as incapable of being D-linked is widely accepted.

In this paper, I would like to challenge this prevailing view, by comparing the behavior of such phrases and that of their Japanese counterparts and to claim that WH-*the hell* phrases can in fact be D-linked, by providing cases where those phrases are D-linked. I would also like to suggest that the nature of WH-*the hell* phrases, as well as Japanese counterparts, is not the alleged non-D-linkability but the identificational focus in the sense of É Kiss (1998), which has to do with various interpretive properties.

1.   The Notion of D-Linking: WH-*the Hell* Phrases as Non-D-Linked WH-Phrases

Pesetsky (1987) introduced a typology of WH-phrases in discourse-related terms. He argues that certain WH-phrases are discourse-linked (D-linked, hereafter) in the sense that felicitous answers for them are necessarily to be found in the set established in the discourse. A good representative would be *which*-phrases, as in the following:

(1)   Which book did you read?   (Pesetsky 1987:108)

In this example a felicitous answer must be drawn from the contextually established set known both to the speaker and the hearer. Otherwise the question would sound odd.

WH-phrases like *who*, *what*, or *how many books* usually do not have such a restriction on choosing felicitous answers. Consider the following example:

(2) How many angels fit on the head of a pin? (Pesetsky 1987: 108)

In unmarked circumstances, neither the speaker nor the hearer of this question is given a particular set or quantity of angels in the discourse. These WH-phrases therefore can be non-D-linked.

Note that these phrases can be D-linked in certain circumstances, as in the following:

(3) a. Who is the fastest runner on our team?
     b. Who among you is a linguistics major?

In (3a) the felicitous answer must be found in *our team*, which is obviously a particular set of individuals which both the speaker and the hearer have in mind. Thus *who* in this case can be said to be D-linked. In (3b) the appropriate answer is necessarily chosen from the group of people referred to here as *you*, which is also a contextually established set of individuals, which again makes the potentially non-D-linked WH-phrase here function as a D-linked one.

There is another type of WH-phrases. Observe the following:

(4) What the hell did you read that in? (Pesetsky 1987:111)

This type of questions, which contain WH-*the hell* phrases like *what the hell* or *who the hell*, are employed to express strong emotion such as surprise or frustration. Pesetsky notes that felicitous answers for them are not to be found in previous discourse. These phrases are thus termed aggressively non-D-linked WH-phrases. The view that the answers for such WH-phrases are unavailable to the speaker is substantiated by the following paradigm:

(5) a. I know who left the party.
     b.* I know who the hell left the party.
     c. I don't know who the hell left the party.

This type of observation is made in Den Dikken and Giannakidou (2002) and Huang and Ochi (2004). (5a) and (5c) are fine, but (5b) sounds quite strange. The anomaly found in (5b) suggests that although the matrix clause entails that the speaker is aware of the person of whom the identity is asked, the lower clause, which involves *who the hell*, tells us that the speaker does not even have an idea as to who that person could be, a clear contradiction.

A strong piece of evidence for treating such WH-phrases as inherently non-D-linked ones comes from the following pair:

(6) a. What the hell book did you read that in?
     b.* Which the hell book did you read that in? (Pesetsky 1987:111)

In the fine (6a) *the hell* is attached to *what*, which is allowed to be non-D-linked. In the impossible (6b) the WH-part is replaced with *which*, which is unambiguously D-linked. The deviance here strongly suggests that WH-*the hell* phrases are invariably non-D-linked.

2.   A Problem: Japanese WH-*the Hell* Phrases

The alleged non-D-linkable status of WH-*the hell* phrases predicts the following. If the incompatibility of *which* and *the hell*, as in **which the hell* in (6b), comes from the non-D-linkability of WH-*the hell* phrases, it is then expected that WH-*the hell* phrases in any language should be incompatible with *which*. The behavior of Japanese WH-*the hell* phrases, however, shows that this prediction is incorrect. Consider the following example, which involves an instance of the Japanese counterpart of a WH-*the hell* phrase:

(7)   Mary-wa   John-ni   ittai   nani-o   ageta-no?   (Pesetsky 1987:111)
        Mary-TOP   John-DAT   the hell   what-ACC   gave-Q
        'What the hell did Mary give John? '

This question involves an instance of *ittai*, a Japanese counterpart of *the hell*, and it expresses the speaker's strong emotions such as anger or frustration. Just like in English, the presence of *ittai*, or the Japanese counterpart of *the hell*, is compatible only with the situation where the speaker has no idea as to what the appropriate answer can be to the question. This is illustrated in (8):

(8) a. Boku-wa   [CP Mary-ga   John-ni   nani-o   ageta-ka] sitteiru.
         I-TOP   Mary-TOP   John-DAT   what-ACC   gave-Q   know
         'I know what Mary gave John.'
     b.* Boku-wa   [CP Mary-ga   John-ni   ittai   nani-o   ageta-ka] sitteiru.
          I-TOP   Mary-NOM   John-DAT   the hell   what-ACC   gave-Q   know
          'I know what the hell Mary gave John.'
     c. Boku-wa   [CP Mary-ga   John-ni   ittai   nani-o   ageta-ka] siranai.
         I-TOP   Mary-NOM   John-DAT   the hell   what-ACC   gave-Q   know-not
         'I don't know what the hell Mary gave John.'

As in (8) the combination of *ittai* and a WH-element is allowed only when the speaker uttering the question does not know the answer to the question, which patterns with the behavior of English WH-*the hell* questions.

   Let us see how *ittai* WH-phrases behave when they are forced to have D-linked interpretation. This is where *ittai* WH-phrases differ from English WH-*the hell* phrases. The former can accompany inherently D-linked WH-phrases. There are at least two types of D-linked WH-phrases in Japanese: *dore* and *docchi*. They differ from each other with respect to the content of

the contextually provided set which the felicitous answers are to be chosen from. In the case of *dore*, the set necessarily has in it three or more candidates, while the set for *docchi* contains exactly two candidates, as in the following:

(9)   a. Three (or more) candidates:

Kimi-wa	susi-to	tempura-to	sasimi-no	dore/*docchi-o	tabeta	no?
you-TOP	sushi-and	tempura-and	sashimi-GEN	dore/docchi-ACC	ate	Q

'Which did you eat, sushi, tempura, or sashimi?'

        b. Two candidates:

Kimi-wa	sakana-to	niku-no	*dore/docchi-o	tabet	no?
you-TOP	fish-and	meat-GEN	dore/docchi-ACC	ate	Q

'Which did you eat, fish or meat?'

In (9a) the set is composed of three candidates, namely *sushi*, *tempura*, and *sashimi*, so *dore*, but not *dotti*, must be employed. In (9b) the number of the candidates is just two, which makes *docchi* the appropriate WH-phrase. Both of these D-linked WH-phrases can be accompanied by *ittai*:

(10)   a.

Kimi-wa	susi-to	tempura-to	sasimi-no	nakade	ittai	dore-o
you-TOP	sushi-and	tempura-and	sashimi-GEN	among	the hell	dore-ACC

tabeta-no?

ate-Q

Lit. 'Which the hell did you eat, sushi, tempura, or sashimi?'

        b.

Kimi-wa	sakana-to	niku-no	uchi	ittai	docchi-o	tabeta	no?
you-TOP	fish-and	meat-GEN	among	the hell	docchi-ACC	ate	Q

Lit. 'Which the hell did you eat, fish or meat?'

These examples are perfect, which suggests the possibility that deviance of *which the hell* may have nothing to do with the notion of D-linking.

3.   The Source of *Which the Hell*

Given the behavior of *ittai* WH-phrases in Japanese, it is necessary to look for an approach to rule out the deviant *which the hell* in a way that makes no reference to the notion of D-linking. One clear difference between *ittai* WH-phrases and WH-*the hell* phrases is that *ittai* can be separated from the WH-phrase that it is associated with, while *the hell* cannot. Consider the following paradigm:

(11)   a.

Mary-wa	(ittai)	John-ni	(ittai)	nani-o	ageta	no?
Mary-TOP	the hell	John-DAT	the hell	what-ACC	gave	Q

'What the hell did Mary give John?'

        b. What (the hell) did you (*the hell) give?

As the contrast in (11) shows, *the hell*, unlike *ittai*, must be adjacent to the WH-phrase that it modifies.

Merchant (2002) makes the similar observation, as in (12):

(12) How {the hell} potent {*the hell} do you think this is? (Merchant 2002:11)

This example shows that *the hell* can modify *how*, but not *how potent*. Merchant takes the behavior of *the hell* in (12) to indicate that the element *the hell* modifies only heads. Thus deviance of **which the hell* can be captured by assuming the following:

(13) a. *The hell* modifies only heads.
      b. *Which i*s not a head.

It is interesting to note that *the hell* is not an isolated instance. There is another element which behaves similarly. Radford (2004), noting the facts in (14), suggests that *else* can only be attached to heads with the additional assumption that *which* is a phrase, not a head.

(14) a. Who else?
      b.* Which else?
      c.* How many people else?

Given this independent motivation, it seems fair to state that **which the hell* is rejected because of the mismatch of the phrasal status of *which* and the categorial requirement on *the hell* as a modifier.

4.   D-Linking WH-*the Hell* Phrases

In the previous section we have seen that deviance of **which the hell* can be captured without mentioning D-linking. The question to be asked now is whether WH-*the hell* phrases can be D-linked on a par with *ittai* WH-phrases in Japanese.

There are cases where WH-*the hell* phrases are D-linked, as in the following:

(15) a. Who the hell has the card? (When playing Old Maid, a card game.)
      b. What the hell is the right answer? (When trying to answer a multiple choice question, like the one in MVA/DMV law test, or in a quiz show.)
      c. Who the hell is the fastest runner on our team?
      d. Who the hell among you saw the movie?
      e. Who the hell in the audience is the singer looking at?
      f. Who the hell is the most powerful character in this game?
      g. Who the hell from the company can you trust?

In each of the questions in (15) it is possible to imagine a situation where both the speaker and the hearer have in mind a certain set of individual items or persons as candidates for answers.

One more sort of motivation for treating WH-*the hell* phrases as D-linkable is more direct. Consider the following paradigm, which has to do with free relatives:

(16)   a.   Whatever you pick, you must pay for it.
        b.   Whatever the hell you pick, you must pay for it.
        c.   Whichever you pick, you must pay for it.
        d.   Whichever the hell you pick, you must pay for it.

There are speakers who do not accept *the hell* being attached to a relative pronoun, but there are also speakers who do accept such a combination. I concentrate on the latter type of dialect here. For the latter type of speakers, (16b) is acceptable, which is trivial, since the combination of what and *the hell* is attested in interrogatives as well. What is interesting is (16d), where *whichever* is accompanied by *the hell*, and it is fine. Since *whichever* is clearly D-linked, (16d) constitutes evidence that WH-*the hell* phrases can be D-linked. The combination of *whichever* and *else* is also possible, as in (17):

(17)   a.   Whichever else you choose is fine.
        b.   Whichever else they may have done badly, this they have done well.

The facts in (16) and (17) come as no surprise if we assume that unlike the interrogative *which*, the relative pronoun *whichever* is a head.

In sum, what we have seen in this section suggests that WH-*the hell* phrases can be D-linked, on a par with Japanese *ittai* WH-phrases.

5.   **Another Well Known Property of WH-*the Hell* Phrases**

Aside from the incompatibility with which, WH-the hell phrases have another well known property. They cannot remain in situ, as in (18):

(18)   a.   Who the hell read what?
        b. * Who read what the hell?

The same thing can be said of Japanese *ittai* WH-phrases. Observe the following paradigm which is adapted from Yanagida (1996):

(19)   a.   Taroo-wa [_{VP} hayaku   nani-o   yonda]-no?
             Taroo-TOP   fast   what-ACC   read-Q
             'What did Taroo read fast?'

b. Taroo-wa   nani-o$_1$ [$_{VP}$ hayaku t_1 yonda]-no?

     Taroo-TOP   what-ACC   fast   read-Q

     'What did Taroo read fast?'

(20)   a.$^?$*Taroo-wa [$_{VP}$ hayaku   ittai   nani-o   yonda]-no?

       Taroo-TOP   fast   the-hell   what-ACC   read-Q

       'What the hell did Taroo read fast?'

    b.   Taroo-wa   ittai   nani-o$_1$ [$_{VP}$ hayaku t_1 yonda]-no?

       Taroo-TOP   the-hell   what-ACC   fast   read-Q

       'What the hell did Taroo read fast?'

Yanagida assumes that VP-adverbs like *hayaku* 'fast' indicate the left edge position of VP. The examples in (19) show that regular WH-phrases like *nani* can either stay in-situ or move out of VP. The ones in (20) indicate that *ittai* WH-phrases cannot stay inside VP but they necessarily have to move out of VP. Given this consideration, we may state that *ittai* WH-phrases, on a par with WH-*the hell* phrases, cannot remain in-situ. Since the incapability to remain in-situ is what is shared by WH-*the hell* phrases and *ittai* WH-phrases, it must be the property which separates them from other regular WH-phrases.

6.   WH-*the Hell* Phrases as Identificationally Focused Phrases
6.1.   Movement of WH-*the Hell* Phrases Driven by Focus

The failure of WH-*the hell* phrases to be in situ has been accounted for by assuming that such phrases are focused in nature. Lasnik and Saito (1992) suggested in the GB era that the first part of their movement to Comp, say, VP adjunction, counts as focus movement, which creates an offending trace. Bošković (2002) examines A'-movement phenomena in east European languages and claims that due to their focused nature, some WH-phrases cannot remain in situ but must overtly move to [Spec, FP] to check the focus feature that they bare. Given this, I assume the following:

(21)   WH-*the hell* phrases and *ittai* WH-phrases must overtly move to [Spec, FP].

(22)   a.   [$_{FP}$ [$_{IP}$ [$_{VP}$]]]
        b.   [$_{IP}$ [$_{FP}$ [$_{VP}$]]]

Here I assume that the Focus projection in English is higher than IP as in (22a), on a par with Rizzi (1999) and the Japanese counterpart is higher than VP, both of the orders in (22) being available. A similar account is provided for the behavior of Japanese *ittai* WH-phrases by Yanagida (1999), who argues that *ittai* WH-phrases must move overtly to [Spec, FP], which she assumes is located right above VP in Japanese.

6.2. WH-*the Hell* Phrases as Identificationally Focused Phrases

I would like to claim further that WH-*the hell* phrases and *ittai* WH-phrases are not just focused, but they are identificationally focused in the sense of É Kiss (1998).

> "The Function of Identificational Focus: An identificational focus represents a subset of the set of contextually or situationally given elements for which the predicate phrase can potentially hold; it is identified as the exhaustive subset of this set for which the predicate phrase actually holds"
>
> (É Kiss 1998:245)

In the foregoing subsections I would like to show that they have the properties which are shared by identificationally focused phrases.

6.2.1. Exhaustiveness

One of the salient properties of identificational focus is exhaustiveness. Here I employ cleft sentences in English exemplified in (23), which É Kiss (1998) shows to be identificationally focused:

(23)   a.   It was a hat and a coat that Mary picked for herself.
        b.   It was a hat that Mary picked for herself.   (É Kiss 1998:252)

The two examples in (23) are not logically equivalent. (23b) cannot be a partial instantiation of what Mary picked for herself. It must be a full, complete set. That is to say, in (23a) Mary picked both a hat and a coat for herself, while in (23b) Mary picked a hat and nothing else. This interpretive contrast in (23) comes from the exhaustive interpretation of the identificational focuses in the cleft sentences.

Notice that anomaly arises if a cleft question invites partial answers, rejecting exhaustive answers. Observe (24):

(24)   a.   Who, for instance, danced with Mary?
        b.   What, for instance, did John buy?

These examples are fine. With this in mind, let us consider (25):

(25)   a.$^{??}$ Who, for instance, was it that danced with Mary?
        b.$^{??}$ What, for instance, was it that John bought?

These questions are strange, which is well expected, considering the exhaustive nature of the focuses in cleft sentences. The same effect emerges with WH-*the hell* questions, as in (26):

(26)   a.$^{??}$ Who the hell, for instance, danced with Mary?
        b.$^{??}$ What the hell, for instance, did John buy?

Thus it seems reasonable to treat WH-*the hell* phrases as being identificationally focused.
    Note that the same effect shows up with Japanese *ittai* WH-questions:

(27)   a.   Tatoeba   (*??*ittai)   dare-ga   Mary-to   odotta no?
            for instance   the hell   who-NOM   Mary-with   danced Q
            'Who the hell, for instance, danced with Mary?'
        b.   John-wa   tatoeba   (*??*ittai)   nani-o   katta   no?
            John-TOP   for instance   the hell   what-ACC   bought   Q
            'What the hell, for instance, did John buy?'

These two questions are just as bad as the ones in (26), suggesting that WH-*the hell* phrases and *ittai* WH-phrases are both identificationally focused.

6.2.2. The Unavailability of Pair List Readings

One more piece of motivation for regarding WH-*the hell* phrases and *ittai* WH-phrases as involving identificational focus comes from their similarity to WH-phrases in the English cleft focus position with respect to the unavailability of pair list readings.
    Let us first consider how identificationally focused phrases are interpreted when they co-occur with quantifiers, taking (28) as an example:

 (28)   It is always Mary that every boy wants to dance with.   (É Kiss 1998:254)

In (28) the focused phrase Mary is in the scope of the universal quantifier *always* and it takes scope over the universal quantifier *every boy*. The sentence thus means that on every relevant occasion, it is Mary and no one else that all the boys want to dance with. This example shows that identificational focused phrases can have a distributive reading when they are c-commanded by a universal quantifier.
    With this in mind, let us consider the following pair of questions in (29):

(29)   a.   What did everyone buy?   (pair list reading possible)
        b.   What was it that everyone bought?   (pair list reading difficult)

(30)   a.   Everyone bought a book.
        b.   John bought a pen, Mary bought a CD, and Bill bought a book.

The question in (29a) allows an individual answer like the one in (30a) and it also permits a pair list answer such as (30b), as if the WH-phrase went back to a position which is c-commanded by *everyone*. But question (29b), where the WH-phrase is identificationally focused, only allows the individual answer and seems incompatible with the pair list answer.
    This is reminiscent of the so-called anti-reconstruction effect which has been widely discussed in the literature since Longobardi (1987), which is expemplified in (31):

(31) a. Tell me what you think that everyone should give to Bill.   (pair list reading allowed)
      b. Tell me what you wonder why everyone gave to Bill.   (pair list reading disallowed)

                                                                  (Rizzi 1990:99)

A pair list reading is possible in (31a), but it is impossible in (31b), where the WH-phrase is extracted out of an island. The lack of such a reading in cases like (31b) has been generally assumed to come from the unavailability of the WH-phrase to be scopally connected to a position which is c-commanded by the universal quantifier due to the intervening island. What is interesting in (29b) is that it lacks the pair list reading despite of the fact that the WH-movement does not cross an island. (29b) can thus be taken to indicate that identificationally focused phrases cannot be scopally reconstructed, at least as far as pair list readings are concerned.

   The same effect shows up in the case of WH-*the hell* phrases:

(32)   What the hell did everyone buy for Max? (pair list reading unavailable)

                                                (Den Dikken and Giannakidou 2002:35)

According to Den Dikken and Giannakidou, (32), where *what the hell* moves to sentence initial position without crossing any island, does not have a pair list reading. The lack of this reading in this question suggests that WH-*the hell* phrases are also identificationally focused.

   This property is shared by *ittai* WH-phrases. Consider the following paradigm:

(33) a. Nani-o   John   to Mary-wa   katta-no?   (pair list reading allowed)
          what-ACC John   and Mary-TOP   bought-Q
          'What did John and Mary buy?'
      b. Ittai   nani-o   John   to Mary-wa   katta-no?   (pair list reading disallowed)
          the hell what-ACC   John   and Mary-TOP   bought-Q
          'What the hell did John and Mary buy?'

In (33), where the WH-phrases are scrambled to sentence initial position, there is a contrast in the availability of pair list readings. In (33a), a pair list reading is allowed, but in (33b), it is disallowed, where the moved element is an *ittai* WH-phrase, which I assume has moved to [Spec, FP], which is assumed to be located above IP in this case, as in (22a). This patterns with what we see in the English cleft question in (29b) and the WH-*the hell* question in (32).

   Let us then see what happens when the WH-phrases remain in-situ.

(34) a. John   to   Mary-wa nani-o   katta-no?   (pair list reading allowed)
          John   and   Mary-TOP what-ACC   bought-Q
          'What did John and Mary buy?'
      b. John   to   Mary-wa ittai   nani-o   katta-no? (pair list reading allowed)
          John   and   Mary-TOP the hell   what-ACC   bought-Q
          'What the hell did John and Mary buy?'

A pair list reading is allowed in both of the questions in (34). (34a) is trivial, since the WH-phrase is c-commanded by the quantified subject, a typical configuration where pair list readings obtain. (34b) involves an *ittai* WH-phrase, which I assume to be in [Spec, FP], which in turn is assumed to be located immediately above VP, as in (22b). In this case, too, a pair list reading is allowed because, as we have seen in (28), identificationally focused phrases can have a distributive reading when c-commanded by a universal quantifier. Given this similarity, *ittai* WH-phrases should be treated as identificationally focused, on a par with WH-*the hell* phrases.

6.2.3. Existential Presupposition

There is another similarity between focus phrases in cleft sentences and WH-*the hell* phrases, which has to do with existential presupposition. Boeckx (2000) notes that it is impossible to use an element like *nothing* in a cleft structure:

(35)   *! It is nothing/nobody that John saw.   (Boeckx 2000:2)

He also notes that English disallows an answer like *nothing* to a cleft-question like (36):

(36)   A: What is it that John bought?   (Boeckx 2000:2)
         B: *! Nothing.

Both (35) and (36) show that the focus in a cleft sentence is existentially presupposed. I assume that this is an interpretive property of identificational focus.

    The same presupposition is present in the case of WH-*the hell* questions:

(37)   a. Who saw John on the way home?   (Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993:261)
        b. Who the hell saw John on the way home?

According to Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993) the two questions in (37) are different from each other in meaning. (37a) can be readily answered by *nobody*, but (37b) can only be asked if there is undeniable evidence that someone saw John. Their observation suggests that WH-*the hell* phrases are existentially presuppositional (aside from rhetorical or cursing interpretation), on a par with cleft focuses. *Ittai* WH-phrases have the same presupposition:

(38)   a. Dare-ga   kitaku   totyuu-de John-o   mita   no?
            who-NOM   going home on the way John-ACC   saw Q
            'Who saw John on the way home?'
        b. Ittai   dare-ga   kitaku   totyuu-de John-o   mita   no?
            the hell who-NOM   going home on the way John-ACC   saw   Q
            'Who saw John on the way home?'

Exactly like in the pair in (37), in (38) it is the (b)-example, which involves *ittai*, that has the presupposition that someone indeed saw John on the way home and does not invite negative answers like *no one*.

6.3.   The Meaning of *the Hell* and *Ittai*

As we have seen, the view that WH-*the hell* phrases and *ittai* WH-phrases are identificationally focused seems quite successful in capturing their behavior. There is one aspect that it cannot handle, however. Recall we saw that the right answers to WH-*the hell* questions are unavailable to speakers uttering those questions. Relevant examples are repeated here:

(5)   a. I know who left the party.
        b. *I know who the hell left the party.
        c. I don't know who the hell left the party.

(8)   a. Boku-wa [CP Mary-ga   John-ni   nani-o   ageta-ka] sitteiru.
            I-TOP   Mary-TOP   John-DAT   what-ACC   gave-Q   know
            'I know what Mary gave John..'
        b.* Boku-wa [CP Mary-ga   John-ni   ittai   nani-o   ageta-ka] sitteiru.
             I-TOP   Mary-NOM   John-DAT   the hell what-ACC   gave-Q   know
            'I know what the hell Mary gave John.'
        c. Boku-wa [CP Mary-ga   John-ni   ittai   nani-o   ageta-ka] siranai.
            I-TOP   Mary-NOM   John-DAT   the hell what-ACC   gave-Q   know-not
            'I don't know what the hell Mary gave John.'

This property cannot follow from their identificationally focused nature, since the following example is acceptable:

(39)   I know who it is that left the party.

This example involves the cleft construction, which has identificational focus. Thus deviance found in (5b) and (8b) cannot come from focus, but it must come from something else.

    It is important to note that not only does (39) lack the oddity found in (5b) and (8b), but it also lacks the speaker's emotional attitude. It is likely that the oddities in (5b) and (8b) are related to the strong emotion observed in them.

    I suggest that the following properties of these phrases are interrelated to each other:

(40)   a. existential presupposition
        b. speaker's ignorance of the answer
        c. speaker's strong emotion

To make things clear, suppose a situation where someone, say, John, went into his house, closed

the door, and locked it with his key. After a while, he realizes that he forgot where he put the key. He keeps searching for it, but he cannot find it. He knows that it is definitely somewhere in his house, but no matter how hard he tries, he cannot remember where he put it. This is a situation that can cause frustration, anger, or other negative emotions. This situation is so puzzling or irritating that John might curse and utter the following:

(41)   The key is not on the desk, it's not on the floor, and it's not under the bed, either.
          I'm sure it's in the house, but I can't find it. Where the hell is it?

Thus the speaker's ignorance of the right answer is not something to follow from existential presupposition, but the ignorance itself has the effect of deriving the speaker's strong emotion in combination with existential presupposition. What is derived is not the ignorance but emotion.

    The use of WH-*the hell* phrases are reminiscent of factive predicates like *regret*, *be shocked*, or *be surprised*. The truth of their complement clauses is presupposed and the speaker is emotionally affected by the truth of the complement clauses. In the case of WH-*the hell* questions the speaker presupposes that those questions require positive answers and he/she is emotionally affected because he/she is nowhere near getting the answer.

    How about the situation where the speaker does know the answer? A typical case would be a quizmaster question. As Authier (1993) notes, a quizmaster generally knows the answer to the question that he/she asks. It would be extremely awkward for a quizmaster to ask a WH-*the hell* question, as in (42):

(42) $^{??}$ Mr. Smith, for $10,000, do you know who the hell was the first queen of England?

In summary, WH-*the hell* and *ittai* WH-questions presuppose the right answer's existence and the unavailability of the answer to the speaker is also presupposed, which agitates him/her and prompts him/her to utter such questions.

7.   Conclusion

In this paper, it was shown that the true nature of English WH-*the hell* phrases and Japanese *ittai* WH-phrases is not the alleged non-D-linkability but identificational focus, which has to do with obligatory overt movement, exhaustiveness, the absence of pair list readings, and existential presupposition. It was also suggested that strong negative emotions that come with these questions are signs that the speakers do not know the right answers.

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